Single Point of Failure in Lock–Alarm Integration

This behavior is being described as a “feature,” but from a security design standpoint it is a serious vulnerability.

Tying the master door lock PIN to automatic system disarm creates a single point of failure: possession of one credential grants both physical access and disables intrusion detection. If that PIN is compromised, guessed, reused, or observed, a bad actor can enter the home with zero resistance from the alarm system. That directly contradicts the purpose of layered security.

There have been years of customer feedback requesting a change, yet the system still offers no way to decouple door access from alarm disarming. At minimum, this should be an optional, user-controlled setting. Many users want the lock to grant entry without disarming the system so the alarm remains active until explicitly turned off.

We found this risk significant enough that we disabled the smart lock entirely. That should be a red flag for a security product: customers should not have to remove features to stay safe.

This is not a niche preference request—it’s a fundamental security concern that deserves to be addressed.